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LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND THE BAD FAITH
EXCEPTION TO THE AMERICAN RULE: A
SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR ADDRESSING
INTENTIONAL LAWYER MISCONDUCT
The number of legal malpractice suits has increased in recent years.'
Courts face difficulty in defining the proper limits of recovery of consequential damages for lawyer malpractice, 2 and as legal action becomes more

frequent and more expensive, courts have begun to re-examine the extent
to which aggrieved clients can recover attorney's fees in legal malpractice
actions.' Fees paid to lawyers who handle the mismanaged underlying legal
matter and subsequent malpractice litigation often make up a large part of
the damages flowing from an attorney's tortious behavior. 4 For example,

an attorney's misconduct may force a client to hire lawyers to correct
1. See

STANDING CoimnrrrE

ON LAwYERs' PROFESSIONAL LiABrrY, CHARACTERISTICS

OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF Tm

NATIONAL

LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA CENTER Vii

(1989) [hereinafter Characteristics](indicating overall increase in total number of legal malpractice claims reported by participating insurance companies between January, 1981 and
September, 1985); STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL LImAn.rrY, LAWYERS'
PROFESSIONAL LiABItrrY UPDATE 1 (1984) (noting increase in number of insurers withdrawing
from legal malpractice insurance marketplace); A. MAILN & D. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
v (2d ed. 1981) (indicating that total number of reported legal malpractice cases in ten years
preceding publication was almost equal to total number of reported malpractice cases in all
of American legal history); D. MEISELMAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE vi
(1980) (warning of changing nature of legal analysis in legal malpractice cases because of
increase in malpractice litigation); D. STERN, AN ATTosRNY's GUm TO MALPRACTICE LtIABirr
3 (1977) (noting increase in number of legal malpractice actions because of higher public
awareness about lawyers' potential malpractice liability).
2. See Bauman, Damages for Legal Malpractice: An Appraisal of the Crumbling Dike
and the Threatening Flood, 61 TEmP. L.R. 1127, 1156-58 (1988) (recognizing difficulty faced
by courts when attempting to establish limits on consequential damages in legal malpractice
cases); MALLEN & LEvrr, supra, note 1 at 360 (noting increase in consequential damage claims
as part of legal malpractice actions because of increased flexibility in notions about proximate
cause); MIsELmAN, supra, note 1 at 55-56 (indicating lack of agreement among courts about
what consequential damages may be recoverable in legal malpractice actions).
3. See Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1110 (1st Cir. 1987) (considering splits in
modern authority on attorney's fees and legal malpractice); Foster v. Duggin, 695 S.W.2d
526, 527 (Tenn. 1985) (rejecting previous authority that supported reduction of award in legal
malpractice cases by negligent lawyer's fee and awarding plaintiff's attorney's fees under
consequential damage theory); Andrews v. Cain, 62 A.D.2d 612, 613, 406 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (reversing previous authority as not in accordance with more modern
legal theory).
4. See Bauman, supra, note 2 at 1150-56 (indicating that practical consequences of legal
malpractice may include subsequent malpractice litigation and attorney's fees incurred to
mitigate damage caused by initial lawyer's misconduct); MALLEN & LEVMT, supra, note 1 at
360-65 (indicating increasing frequency of claims of damages resulting from litigation with
third parties, attempts at mitigating damage caused by defendant attorney, and actual malpractice litigation); MISELMAN, supra, note 1 at 55 (noting problems with third party litigation
as a result of legal malpractice).
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damage or handle litigation with third parties resulting from the previous
attorney's misconduct.5 The aggrieved client also incurs the expense of
prosecuting the ensuing legal malpractice action.
Courts generally agree that wronged clients may recover certain attorney's fees. 6 For example, most courts allow the recovery of fees incurred
in mitigation of damage done by the prior attorney's misconduct, in
duplication of the previous lawyer's work, and in subsequent litigation with
third parties when the initial attorney's misconduct or negligence causes that
litigation. 7 Courts that have examined the question of recoverability of legal
fees for successful litigation of actual legal malpractice actions, however,
have been unable to agree upon the proper limits of recovery.8 Although
some courts reason that these fees should be recoverable, others hold that

5. See Bauman, supra, note 2 at 1150-51 (indicating that legal malpractice victims
frequently need to hire attorneys for subsequent action or mitigation of damages); MALLEN &
LEvrr, supra, note 1 at 360-62 (same); MEIsELMAN, supra, note 1 at 61 (same).
6. See infra note 7 and accompanying text (indicating that courts have held particular
legal fees recoverable for legal malpractice plaintiffs).
7. See Sorenson v. Fio Rito, 90 Ill. App. 3d 368,'372, 413 N.E.2d 47, 52 (1980) (holding
counsel's fees recoverable by plaintiff as element of compensatory damage). In Sorenson the
Illinois Court of Appeals considered the issue of damages arising from an attorney's negligent
failure to file inheritance and estate tax returns in a timely manner, resulting in $6,409.25 in
penalties and interest against the plaintiff. Id. at 370, 413 N.E.2d at 49-50. The plaintiff,
attempting to mitigate the damage caused by the defendant attorney's negligence, paid $1,500
in legal fees to a subsequently hired lawyer who tried to obtain a refund of the penalties and
interest. Id., 413 N.E.2d at 50. The Sorenson court recognized that the American Rule bars
litigants from recovering legal fees. Id., 413 N.E.2d at 50. However, the court went on to
find that the particular fees involved in this case were recoverable, reasoning that courts, in
developing the American Rule, never intended to preclude a plaintiff from becoming fully
compensated and that, like any other tortfeas6r, the negligent attorney should be responsible
for allthe results of his wrongful acts or omissions. Id. at 372, 413 N.E.2d at 51-52.
Other courts almost universally hold that legal malpractice plaintiffs may recover other
legal expenses caused by the defendant's misconduct, including litigation costs for actions
against third parties. See United Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Law Firm of Best, Sharp, Thomas
& Glass, 624 F.2d 145, 149-50 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding jury could consider whether legal fees
incurred as a result of legal malpractice were recoverable as damages); Gustavson v. O'Brien,
87 Wis. 2d 193, 200, 274 N.W.2d 627, 631 (1979) (concluding that when lawyer's malpractice
forces wronged client to litigate with third parties lawyer is liable for client's attorney's fees
incurred in litigation with third parties); Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 347, 252
N.W.2d 107, 121 (1977) (holding that trial court may award attorney's fees plaintiff paid to
defend separate lawsuit resulting from attorney's wrongful actions as damages in legal malpractice action); Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 263 La. 774, 788, 269 So. 2d 239,
245 (1972) (holding that legal malpractice plaintiff was entitled to recover additional attorney's
fees incurred as a result of defendant's negligence in handling an inheritance matter); Hiss v.
Friedberg, 201 Va. 572, 577-79, 112 S.E.2d 871, 875-77 (1960) (holding award of attorney's
fees incurred in separate action filed against third party proper as an element of damages
resulting from original lawyer's negligence).
8. Compare Foster v. Duggin, 695 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tenn. 1985) (holding award of
attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in successful prosecution of legal malpractice suit recoverable as element of consequential damages) with McGlone v. Lacey, 288 F. Supp. 662, 665
(D.S.D. 1968) (mentioning that attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in pursuit of legal
malpractice action are unrecoverable under American Rule).

1991]

INTENTIONAL LA WYER MISCONDUCT

1143

the award is improper.9 Most courts that refuse to allow the award rely on

the American Rule.' 0 The American Rule (the Rule) is a judicially created
principle providing that absent statutory or contractual authority, neither
party in a lawsuit may recover legal fees incurred in prosecuting or defending
an action." American courts developed the Rule in an attempt to allow
open access to the legal system regardless of wealth, ease the burden on
courts during post-trial proceedings, and maintain the independence of

counsel during trial. 12 Most jurisdictions recognize exceptions to the Rule

9. See Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 851, 858 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that although plaintiff generally may not recover attorney's fees for prosecution
of legal malpractice action, plaintiff may recover fees above that of the original attorney if
incurred because of the original attorney's misconduct), aff'd, 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982). In
Jenkins the plaintiff retained the defendants to represent him in a personal injury action
against a railroad for a contingency fee of one-third of the plaintiff's recovery. Id. at 854.
The defendants failed to file suit before the statute of limitations ran, and the court dismissed
the suit. Id. at 854-55. The plaintiff then began a legal malpractice action against the defendants,
for which his new counsel charged $5,000 in addition to one-third of the recovery. Id. at 858.
During the legal malpractice action, the trial court refused to allow the plaintiff to introduce
evidence at trial showing that his legal costs for the ensuing legal malpractice suit were higher
than they would have been had the defendants filed the personal injury suit in a timely
manner. Id. The Louisiana Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the plaintiff could
recover the additional $5,000 as an extra expense the plaintiff would not have incurred but
for the defendant's negligence. Id. The court did not award fees in excess of the $5,000. Id.
Other courts also strictly apply the American Rule to legal malpractice suits, although
they recognize limited exceptions. See Widemshek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 342, 117 N.W.2d
275, 277 (1962) (stating general rule that legal malpractice plaintiff may not recover attorney's
fees incurred in malpractice action); Hiss, 201 Va. at 577, 112 S.E.2d at 875 (repeating rule
that plaintiff generally may not recover attorney's fees incurred in litigating legal malpractice
action); but see Foster, 695 S.W.2d at 527 (reasoning that attorney's fees are recoverable
because they flow from lawyer's breach of contract).
10. See Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 418 (Minn. 1986) (denying plaintiffs' claims
for attorney's fees incurred in bringing malpractice action based on American Rule); Whitney
v. Buttrick, 376 N.W.2d 274, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to allow plaintiff's recovery
of attorney's fees without statutory or contractual authorization); McClain v. Faraone, 369
A.2d 1090, 1093-94 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (disallowing plaintiffs recovery of attorney's fees
in malpractice action stemming from negligent title search because of American Rule); Erving's
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Thompson, 204 So. 2d 188, 192 (Miss. 1967) (refusing to assess cost of
previous appeal to defendant attorney in legal malpractice action); Widemshek, 17 Wis. 2d at
342, 117 N.W.2d at 277 (applying general proposition that aggrieved client generally may not
recover expenses of litigating legal malpractice case absent statutory or contractual authority);
Hiss, 201 Va. at 577-79, 112 S.E.2d at 875 (applying general proposition that attorney's fees
are unrecoverable without statutory or contractual authority to facts of legal malpractice case).
11. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 82 (6th ed. 1990) (defining American Rule as judicial
prohibition on award of attorney's fees to litigants without statutory or contractual authority);
32 AM. Jus. 2D FederalPractice § 169 (1982) (stating general rule that litigants in American
courts may not recover attorney's fees absent statutory authority); see also Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (recognizing that American Rule
precludes recovery of attorney's fees without statutory or contractual authority).
12. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (summarizing rationales for American
Rule).
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in cases involving
bad faith, contempt of court, and certain suits resembling
13
class actions.
Many courts strictly apply the American Rule in legal malpractice cases
by refusing to allow the plaintiff to recover the attorney's fees incurred in
the actual malpractice action.1 4 In offset cases, however, some courts essentially will award attorney's fees to the plaintiff in an indirect manner." In
offset cases the defendant attorney requests that the court or jury reduce
the plaintiff's damage award by the amount the plaintiff would have paid
the defendant attorney for handling the underlying legal matter because the
plaintiff would have owed him that amount upon successful completion of
the underlying legal matter.' 6 For example, if the defendant attorney in a
legal malpractice action provided $4,000 worth of legal services to the
plaintiff and the judgment against him for the malpractice action involving
the same matter was for $10,000, the defendant might ask that the court
or jury subtract his $4,000 fee from the malpractice award. According to
the attorney, the offset would restore both parties to exactly the positions
they would have enjoyed but for the defendant's tortious conduct.17 Many

courts refuse to reduce the award by such an offset. 8 A close look at the
opinions of courts that refuse to award offsets reveals that the courts'
refusals are, in effect, awards of attorney's fees to plaintiffs in violation of
the American Rule. 9

13. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text (summarizing exceptions to American
Rule).
14. See Gilchrist v. Perl, 387 N.W.2d 412, 418 (Minn. 1986) (denying plaintiffs' claims
for attorney's fees incurred in bringing malpractice action based on American Rule); Whitney
v. Buttrick, 376 N.W.2d 274, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to allow plaintiff's recovery
of attorney's fees without statutory or contractual authority); McClain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d
1090, 1093-94 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (disallowing plaintiff's recovery of attorney's fees in
malpractice action stemming from negligent title search because of American Rule); Erving's
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Thompson, 204 So. 2d 188, 192 (Miss. 1967) (refusing to assess cost of
previous appeal to defendant attorney in legal malpractice action); Widemshek v. Fale, 17
Wis. 2d 337, 342, 117 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1962) (applying American Rule strictly to legal
malpractice action); Hiss v. Friedberg, 201 Va. 572, 577, 112 S.E.2d 871, 875 (1960) (restating
general rule that plaintiff in legal malpractice case may not recover litigation expenses absent
statutory or contractual authority).
15. See, e.g., Strauss v. Fost, 213 N.J. Super 239, 242, 517 A.2d 143, 145 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1986) (refusing to deduct defendant attorney's fees for underlying legal matter
from judgment in legal malpractice action); Andrews v. Cain, 62 A.D.2d 612, 613, 406
N.Y.S.2d 168, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (same); Bernard v. Walkup, 272 Cal. App. 2d 595,
77 Cal. Rptr. 544, 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (same).
16. See infra notes 20-35 and accompanying text (showing examples of courts that deny
offsets).
17. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (explaining compensatory purpose of
damage awards).
18. See infra notes 20-35 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts denying
offsets).
19. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (explaining that courts uphold American
Rule despite fact that in operation Rule denies truly full recovery to plaintiff).
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Courts that deny offset reductions in legal malpractice actions offer

several grounds for their denial. ° One prevalent view is that the negligent
attorney should not profit from his own wrongful act or shoddy workmanship. 21 Courts applying this view reason that deducting a fee from a damage
award rewards an attorney for his misconduct or negligence.22 Furthermore,
the courts reason that deducting the fee effectively forces a wronged client
to pay for a service two times, once to the attorney who falls to perform

properly, and again to the lawyer who must ultimately vindicate the client's
rights through a malpractice suit. 23 Courts also note that in cases in which
an attorney had one percentage set to deduct upon settlement and another
higher percentage set to deduct after trial, if the attorney failed to take any
action whatsoever on the suit the court cannot ascertain which percentage
to apply in calculating the offset.24 These courts reason that because the

lawyer's misconduct created the need for speculation about the correct
percentage, the lawyer should bear the burden of loss rather than profit
from his misconduct. 2
A second ground courts rely on for denying offsets of attorney's fees
is that the fees from the subsequent malpractice action "cancel out" fees
the negligent attorney would have received upon proper handling of the
underlying legal matter.2 6 Courts applying this view emphasize the fact that

20. See infra notes 21-35 and accompanying text (explaining arguments employed by
courts that refuse to award offsets to legal malpractice defendants).
21. See Strauss v. Fost, 213 N.J. Super. 239, 242, 517 A.2d 143, 145 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) (basing decision on the proposition that negligent attorney should not recover
fees for poor work); Andrews v. Cain, 62 A.D.2d 612, 613, 406 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978) (noting that crediting attorney's fee against plaintiff's damages rewards
lawyer's poor work); Kane, Kane & Kritzer, Inc. v. Altagen, 107 Cal. App. 3d 36, 44, 165
Cal. Rptr. 534, 538, (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (same).
22. See Kane, 107 Cal. App. 3d 36, 44, 165 Cal. Rptr. 534, 538 (noting unfairness of
allowing negligent lawyer to recover fee); Andrews, 62 A.D.2d at 613, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 169
(expressing aim of precluding negligent lawyer's recovery of fee). But see Strauss, 213 N.J.
Super. at 243, 517 A.2d at 145 (stating that sometimes even negligent attorney might recover
fees on quantum meruit basis where attorney's action, though negligent, benefitted client).
23. See Kane, 107 Cal. App. 3d at 44, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 538 (concluding that awarding
offset forces client to pay for same service twice); Andrews, 62 A.D.2d at 613, 406 N.Y.S.2d
at 169 (noting unfairness of effectively forcing client to pay two legal fees for one underlying
matter).
24. See Andrews, 62 A.D.2d at 613, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (noting difficulty of determining
amount of hypothetical contingent fee); Bernard v. Walkup, 272 Cal. App. 2d 595, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 544, 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (refusing to allow deduction of defendant's contingency
fee in legal malpractice suit because of its speculative nature).
25. See Andrews, 62 A.D.2d at 613, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (refusing to allow negligent
lawyer to profit from evidentiary difficulties of his own creation); Bernard, 272 Cal. App. 2d
at 595, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 551 (noting that law precludes party creating difficulty in assessing
damage from complaining when assessment works against his interests).
26. See, e.g., Togstad v. Veseley, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 696 (Minn.
1980) (accepting reasoning of courts that disallow deduction of hypothetical contingency fees
based on canceling out theory); Duncan v. Lord, 409 F. Supp. 687, 691-92 (E.D. Penn. 1976)
(reasoning that deducting hypothetical contingency fee results in plaintiff's incomplete com-
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the defendant's misconduct forced the plaintiff to hire an additional attorney
to pursue the legal malpractice action. Therefore, these courts conclude that
deducting the defendant attorney's fee from the plaintiff's damage award
results in less than full compensation for the plaintiff.27
A third approach courts take in denying offsets of fees for underlying
legal matters is to treat the plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in the legal
malpractice action as part of the consequential damages stemming from the
defendant's malpractice. 21 Courts espousing this view simply extend the basic
common law principles of tort or contract, and reason that the plaintiff
can recover fees incurred in the legal malpractice action because the fees
flow from the defendant's negligent performance or failure to perform
altogether. 29 After finding that the defendant is liable for the cost of the
legal malpractice action, these courts credit the fees earned by the defendant
for the original legal matter against the cost of the plaintiff's legal mal-

pensation and that plaintiff's legal fees incurred in legal malpractice thus canceled out defendant
attorney's offset from damage award); Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 174, 179 N.W.2d
288, 307 (1970) (indicating, in dicta, that plaintiff's fees incurred in pursuit of legal malpractice
suit canceled out fees plaintiff owed defendant for underlying medical malpractice claim).
27. See Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 696 (noting that offset of fee improper because of
additional expense to plaintiff of hiring another lawyer for legal malpractice); Duncan, 409 F.
Supp. at 692 (determining that deducting hypothetical fee results in incomplete compensation);
Christy, 288 Minn. at 174, 179 N.W.2d at 307 (basing assertion about non-recovery of fees
on fact that defendant's tortious behavior forced plaintiff to hire attorney for legal malpractice
suit).
28. See Foster v. Duggin, 695 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tenn. 1985) (holding award of attorney's
fees incurred by plaintiff in prosecuting legal malpractice action proper as element of consequential damages). In Foster the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether an attorney
found liable for malpractice may have the judgment against him offset by the amount of his
fee had he handled the underlying legal matter competently. Id. at 526. The defendant in
Foster failed to file a personal injury action within the one year statute of limitations for
personal injury actions in Tennessee. Id. The court first recognized two lines of authority
regarding offsets of fees against judgments in legal malpractice actions. Id. at 527. The first
line held that the fee is deductible on the grounds that the wronged client should recover only
what he would have received in the original action or legal matter. Id. The second line held
that the attorney is estopped from claiming any fee by reason of his wrongful act. Id. The
court then held the attorney's fees from the underlying action not deductible from the judgment
because the defendant's negligence forced the plaintiffs to incur expenses in prosecuting the
subsequent legal malpractice action. Id. The court denied that taking the subsequent litigation
into account amounted to an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff, reasoning that the
"additional fees necessary to pursue this action are in the nature of incidental damages flowing
from [the defendant's] breach of the contract." Id.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals takes a similar approach. That court held
that damages sustained by a wronged client because of a lawyer's negligence included the cost
of the additional malpractice action ultimately necessary to recover on the underlying claim.
Winter v. Brown, 365 A.2d 381, 386 (D.C. 1976) (holding that cost of legal malpractice action
was element of consequential damages caused by lawyer's negligence).
29. See Foster, 695 S.W.2d at 527 (finding that defendant's negligence caused malpractice
suit); Winter, 365 A.2d at 386 (holding that trial court did not err by refusing to reduce
amount of judgment in legal malpractice action following defendant's mishandling of a medical
malpractice suit because the fees incurred in the legal malpractice were recoverable as consequential damages).
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practice suit.3 0 Because the defendant attorney has to pay his former client's
legal fees as damages, the attorney's own fees merely make up for the
amount he already owes the plaintiff. Therefore, the consequential damage
approach differs from the "canceling out" approach only in that the latter
technically does not recognize that the fees incurred in the malpractice action
are an item of recoverable damages. 3'
Finally, one court refuses to deduct the defendant attorney's fee from
the plaintiff's damages for public policy reasons based on the special nature
of the attorney-client relationship. a2 According to this court, the attorneyclient relationship distinguishes legal malpractice from a classic contract or
tort situation because the legal malpractice involves a breach of this special
relationship. 3 The argument behind this theory for refusal to allow an
offset centers on the idea that, without the relationship of trust,, a lawyer
cannot effectively act to vindicate his client's rights.3 4 The court applying
the public policy rationale purported to do so because of the lawyer's unique
role and that role's importance in our society and thus refused to allow the
negligent attorney to recover a fee because he breached the special attorney33
client relationship by committing malpractice.
The four approaches courts have taken with regard to the denial of
offsets are inappropriate in the context of the fundamental rules of American
tort and contract law. The first approach, which applies the rationale that
a lawyer should not profit from his tortious conduct, is weak because it

30. See Foster, 695 S.W.2d at 527 (considering plaintiff's fees incurred in legal malpractice
action while denying credit to defendant for fees in underlying action); Winter, 365 A.2d-at
386 (crediting defendant's original fee against plaintiff's costs in legal malpractice litigation).
31. Compare Foster, 695 S.W.2d at 527 (finding specifically that cost of legal malpractice
litigation was damage flowing from defendant's breach) with Duncan V. Lord, 409 F. Supp.
687, 692 (E.D. Penn. 1976) (applying canceling out rationale without mentioning attorney's
fees as element of damages).
32. See Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 44, 556 N.Y.S.2d
239, 241-42, 555 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1990) (holding that attorney defendant in legal malpractice
action could not offset attorney's fees he would have received had he successfully executed
the underlying legal matter because malpractice was breach of special relationship). In Campagnola the New York Court of Appeals rejected the "canceling out" and consequential
damage rationales, while upholding an award of attorneys fees to the plaintiff on the grounds
that the lawyer-client relationship is special and that legal malpractice is therefore different
from other torts. Id. at 43-44, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 243, 555 N.E.2d at 615. In conclusion, the
court reasoned:
our decision is not premised on compensating plaintiffs for attorneys fees incurred
in actions for legal malpractice. We neither authorize the recovery of legal fees in
this case as consequential damages nor "shift[]" the amount of defendants' contingency fee to plaintiff as part of the value of her claim. We hold only that plaintiff's
recovery is not to be diminished by the amount of defendants' unearned fee.
Id. at 45, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 243, 555 N.E.2d at 615.
33. See id. at 43, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42, 555 N.E.2d at 614 (refusing to strictly apply
contract principles to legal malpractice aciion because of special relationship).
34. See id. at 43, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 242, 555 N.E.2d at 614 (distinguishing legal malpractice
from ordinary breach of contract because of attorney's duty toward client).
35. Id. at 44, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 242, 555 N.E.2d at 614.
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fails to account for the fact that the primary goal of damage awards is to
compensate the wronged party.3 6 The first approach toward denying offsets
results in the wronged client's overcompensation. 37 Absent malpractice, an
attorney receives a fee upon successful completion of his work. Because the
amount of the judgment in a legal malpractice action is the value of the
lawyer's work upon successful completion, refusal to offset the judgment
by the amount of the defendant's fee gives the wronged client a windfall
in the form of the defendant's unpaid fee. 38 Furthermore, courts using this
approach improperly focus on punishing the negligent lawyer by preventing
the attorney from recovering his fee. 39 In most civil litigation courts will
decline to punish a tortfeasor and instead focus on the plaintiff's compensation. 4° The courts employing the rationale that a negligent lawyer should
not profit from his wrongdoing fail to justify this treatment by distinguishing
41
legal malpractice from other civil wrongs.
The second approach, refusal to deduct the initial attorney's fees on
the grounds that the fees incurred in the subsequent malpractice action
cancel out the original fees, analytically is unsound. 42 In fact, use of the
"canceling out" rationale as a justification for refusing to offset attorney's
fees from a plaintiff's legal malpractice judgment is tantamount to awarding
attorney's fees for the legal malpractice action to the plaintiff.4 3 Therefore,
36. See E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 871 (1990) (stating that basic goal of contract
remedy is to put injured party in same position as if defendant fully performed on contract);
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON ON TORTS 20 (5th ed. 1984) (recognizing that compensation is
primary function of tort remedy); RESTATEMNENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 comment a
(1981) [hereinafter Restatement of Contracts] (stating that remedial goal of contract damage
award is to place wronged party is position expected upon completion of contract); RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a (1979) [hereinafter Restatement of Torts] (stating
that first purpose of tort law is to compensate wronged party); C. McCoRMCK, DAMAGES 560
(1935) (stating that primary aim of tort damage award is plaintiff's compensation).
37. See Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 47, 556 N.Y.S.2d
239, 244, 555 N.E.2d 611, 616 (1990) (Simons, J., dissenting) (complaining that fee deduction
gives plaintiff more than he would have received without malpractice); Moores v. Greenberg,
834 F.2d 1105, 1111 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing that absent fee deduction, legal malpractice
plaintiff's net gain is greater than gain upon proper completion of underlying legal matter).
38. See Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 47, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 244, 555 N.E.2d at 616 (Simons,
J, dissenting) (criticizing effect of overcompensating legal malpractice plaintiffs when court
disallows fee deduction from judgment); Moores, 834 F.2d at 1111 (recognizing that malpractice
plaintiff receives windfall when fee not deducted).
39. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (explaining punitive theory behind
offset cases).
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (focusing on compensatory, rather than
punitive, purpose of damage awards in civil actions).
41. See supra notes 21-25 (showing cases in which court operates on punitive theory);
see also Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1111 (1st Cir. 1987) (criticizing theory disallowing
offset of fees for negligent attorney because theory ignores compensatory purpose of damage
awards).
42. See Moores, 834 F.2d at 1111 (criticizing circular nature of argument in favor of
"canceling out" rationale because argument "assumes what it sets out to determine: that
plaintiff is entitled to recover the attorney's fees.").
43. See id., 834 F.2d at 1111 (noting that use of the "canceling out" rationale is
essentially a method of indirectly forcing defendant to carry cost of litigation).
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in practical terms, the result of a decision based on the "canceling out"
theory largely is indistinguishable from the result of an award of attorney's
fees as an element of consequential damages. 44 Like decisions based on the
consequential damage approach, decisions based on the "canceling out"
rationale are subject to criticism because they violate the American Rule,
which prohibits award of attorney's fees to parties as an element of
5
4

damages.
The third approach, which involves treating the attorney's fees incurred
in the legal malpractice action as' consequential damages, 6 is problematic
in light of the American Rule. 47 American courts established the Rule, which
generally requires parties to bear their own litigation costs, early in United
States legal history." In upholding the Rule, courts rely on a number of
important policy considerations favoring the Rule, despite criticism from
49
litigants and commentators.
A popular criticism of the American Rule is that as a practical matter,
the Rule operates to deny full recovery to plaintiffs.5 0 For example, upon
winning a lawsuit tort victims or parties wronged by breaches of contract
recover only the amount necessary to compensate them for their loss. 51 The

44. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (outlining cases in which courts do not
award offset on consequential damage theory).
45. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (criticizing consequential damage theory
in light of American Rule).
46. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (outlining cases decided on consequential
damage theory).
47. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (defiming American Rule).
48. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 234 (1796) (holding counsel's fees
improper as part of damage award). In Arcambel the Supreme Court articulated the general
principal, still in effect today, that an award of attorney's fees would violate the "general
practice of the United States". Id.
Subsequent courts have upheld the American Rule well into modem times. See, e.g.,
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (upholding and
applying American Rule); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 128 (1974) (same); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S.
714, 719 (1967) (same).
49. See infra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (outlining policy considerations in favor
of American Rule).
50. See, e.g., McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing
Legal Services, 40 FoRDHAm L. REv. 761, 783 (1972) (criticizing American Rule's preclusion
of full recovery for indigent plaintiffs); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical
Development, 38 U. CoLo. L. Rav. 202 (1966) (criticizing American Rule as precluding full
compensation); Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and The Great Society, 54 CALF.
L. Ray. 792, 793 (1966) (emphasizing American Rule's tendency to work hardship on indigent
persons because it precludes full compensation and deters attorneys from working for indigent
persons); Judicial Council of Massachusetts, First Report, 11 MAss. L.Q. 1, 64 (1925)
[hereinafter First Report] (complaining that American Rule precludes full compensation for
plaintiffs); see also F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 128 (1974) (noting appellate court's reasoning that failure to award attorney's fees results
in inadequate compensation for plaintiff in action under Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270).
51. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting compensatory purpose of damage
awards).
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goal of these compensatory damages is to put the plaintiff in the same
position he would enjoy had the defendant not harmed the plaintiff or
breached the contract.5 2 In tort and contract cases compensatory damages
generally are the only amounts awarded the plaintiff.53 The plaintiff must
pay attorney 's fees out of his own pocket or have the attorney deduct the
4
attorney's fee from the amount recovered as compensatory damages.1
Although occasionally punitive damages indirectly cover the plaintiff's attorney's fees in tort cases, 5 courts generally refuse to award such fees as
an item of damages because of the Afnerican Rule.5 6 Thus, a successful
plaintiff recovering only compensatory damages is not in fact whole because
he must pay his lawyer out of the award.
Although -courts and commentators have criticized the American Rule
because of its failure to compensate the plaintiff fully, courts have justified
the rule based on countervailing policy considerations. 5 7 First, courts argue

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See McLaughlin, supra, note 50 at 783 (noting that American Rule fails to account
for fact that plaintiff must pay lawyer); Stoebuck, supra, note 50 at 202 (noting compensation
problem arising from operation of American Rule because plaintiff must pay lawyer); Ehrenzweig, supra, note 50 at 793 (same); First Report, supra, note 50 at 64 (criticizing American
Rule as unjust in tort cases because attorney's fees are expense to plaintiff, just as doctor's
bills are).
55. See Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 230-31 (1872) (noting that punitive
damages may indirectly cover legal fees, but that courts generally do not award fees); see also
O'Leary v. Industrial Park Corp., 211 Conn. 648, 560 A.2d 968, 969 (1989) (recognizing
court's or jury's power to award attorney's fees as part of punitive damages); Markey v.
Santangelo, 195 Conn. 76, 485 A.2d 1305, 1308 (1985) (upholding award of attorney's fees as
punitive damages); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Steele, 373 So. 2d 797, 801 (Miss. 1979)
(recognizing attorney's fee awards as proper part of punitive damage award).
56. See Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1110 (Ist Cir. 1987) (noting general
application of American Rule in legal malpractice actions); Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 851, 859 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that American Rule bars plaintiff's
recovery of attorney's fees in legal malpractice action), aff'd, 422 So.2d 1109 (La. 1982);
Widemshek v. Fale, 17 Wis. 2d 337, 342, 117 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1962) (stating general rule
that legal malpractice plaintiff may not recover attorney's fees); Hiss v. Friedberg, 201 Va.
572, 577, 112 S.E.2d 871, 875 (1960) (recognizing general rule that attorney's fees are
unrecoverable for legal malpractice plaintiff).
57. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra, note 50 at 783 (criticizing American Rule); Stoebuck,
supra, note 50 at 202 (criticizing American Rule as precluding full compensation); Ehrenzweig,
supra, note 50 at 793 (same); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?,
49 lowA L. Rav. 75, 81 (1963) (criticizing American Rule as outdated because modern policy
of law encourages settlement rather than litigation); First Report, supra, note 50 at 64
(complaining that American Rule precludes full compensation for plaintiffs); see also F.D.
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 128 (1974) (noting
appellate court's reasoning that failure to award attorney's fees results in inadequate compensation for plaintiff in an action under Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270).
The United States Supreme Court has defended the American Rule on several occasions
despite criticism from other courts and commentators. See F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 128 (rejecting
appellate court's award of attorney's fees based on concerns about inadequate compensation
because court "merely restat[ed] one of the oft-repeated criticisms of the American Rule.");
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that because the outcome of any litigation is uncertain, a litigant should
not have to suffer a penalty for exercising his basic right to access the
judicial system by either prosecuting or defending a lawsuit.58 Additionally,
a rule allowing a successful litigant to recover attorney's fees might discourage indigent persons from bringing meritorious suits because of a fear
9
of losing and having to pay the opposing party's attorney's feesA
In further support of the American Rule, courts have noted that
requiring a trial court to determine what amount is "reasonable" when
considering an award of attorney's fees is problematic. 60 Because counsel's
fees may vary depending on the lawyer, the client, and the legal matter
involved, fees are highly speculative.61 Also, parties' knowledge that the
losing side will pay the winner's fees creates the possibility that litigants
will not make reasonable efforts to settle cases and will inflate fee estimates
after litigation. 62 Lastly, requiring the court to determine what amount
constitutes "reasonable" legal fees prolongs litigation and imposes a heavy
burden on the court and the parties involved in terms of time and further
expense. 63 Therefore, the American Rule eases the administrative burden on
the courts and expedites litigation.
A final rationale for the American Rule is that any relaxation of the
Rule could interfere with lawyers' independent representation. 6 4 If lawyers
know that the judge in a case will control their compensation, the lawyers
may be less zealous in arguing their client's case or making certain tactical
maneuvers for fear of irritating the judge. 65 Accordingly, the American Rule
also helps preserve independent advocacy.

Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967) (noting authority
in support of American Rule, despite criticism); Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S.
227, 237 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (defending American Rule because of possible
hardship to poor litigants).
58. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (recognizing uncertainty of outcome in litigation
and importance of allowing unfettered access to courts).
59. See id. at 718 (noting importance of keeping courts open to poor); Farmer, 379 U.S.
at 236-37 (holding that courts should closely scrutinize any litigation costs held out by winning
party as item of damages because to hold otherwise would discourage litigants from bringing
meritorious suits).
60. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (noting difficulty of determining what counsel's
fees are reasonable); Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872) (noting wide
variation in amount of fees because of varying competence levels among practitioners).
61. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (noting speculative nature of legal fees); Oelrichs,
82 U.S. (15 Wail.) at 231 (same).
62. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (expressing concern over abuse by counsel if fees
awarded to winning litigants); Oelrichs, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 231 (same).
63. See Fleischmann, 386 U.S. at 718 (justifying American Rule as easing judicial
administration); Oelrichs, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 231 (expressing desire to ease burden on court
and litigants).
64. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. at 129
(noting problem with court determining attorney's fees at close of case because "the earnings
of the attorney [would] flow from the pen of the judge before whom he argues.").
65. See id. (noting that American Rule helps preserve independent advocacy).
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The American Rule, despite its benefits, operates contrary to common

law principles concerning consequential damages. 6 Courts award consequential damages to compensate victims for damage from the consequences
of misbehavior. 67 Because litigation is generally a foreseeable consequence
of all tortious behavior, a plaintiff should recover litigation expenses under
strict application of consequential damage principles. 68 However, courts that
have dealt with the American Rule acknowledge the arguments against the

Rule based on the consequential damage theory and reject those arguments
because of the countervailing benefits of the Rule. 69 Thus, the Rule reflects

a policy choice made by courts that the considerations favoring the Rule
outweigh any problems parties may experience because of the Rule's pre-

clusion of full compensation. 70 If courts ignore the Rule and base attorney's
fee awards in legal malpractice suits entirely on the consequential damage

theory, courts should award attorney's fees in all civil litigation. Successful
plaintiffs in most civil litigation could base their claims for attorney's fees
on the fact that absent the defendant's misconduct they would not have
incurred the expense of a lawsuit.
The opinions of courts that have dealt with the American Rule dem-

onstrate that courts follow the Rule despite the fact that it precludes the
plaintiffs full compensation. 7' Because legal malpractice actions are grounded
in common law tort and contract principles they are indistinguishable from
many other forms of wrongful conduct. Therefore, by awarding attorney's
fees as part of consequential damages in legal malpractice actions courts
unnecessarily erode the American Rule.7 2 Moreover, awarding attorney's

fees to successful plaintiffs in legal malpractice suits undercuts one of the
most important policies behind the Rule because the award penalizes the

66. See FARNSWORTH, supra, note 36 at 915-16 (asserting that party breaching contract
is liable only for reasonably foreseeable damages resulting from breach); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra, note 36 at 169-70 (asserting that tortfeasor is responsible only for reasonably foreseeable
results of tortious conduct); Restatement of Contracts, supra, note 36 at § 351 comment a
(finding that party breaching contract is liable only for foreseeable consequences of breach);
but see Restatement of Torts, supra, note 36 at § 917 comment d (asserting that tortfeasor is
responsible for all consequences of tortious behavior whether foreseeable or not); see also
supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that primary purpose of damage awards is
compensatory).
67. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing purpose of tort and contract
damages as plaintiff's compensation); supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining
consequential damage theories).
68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing principles of foreseeability in
consequential damage awards and compensatory purpose of such awards).
69. See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116,
129 (1974) (striking balance of interests in favor of American Rule despite argument that
litigation costs actually are part of damages).
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (noting courts' acceptance of American
Rule despite problems caused by incomplete compensation of plaintiffs).
72. Id.
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lawyer for merely defending himself in court.73 Until courts eliminate the

Rule altogether or find some valid ground on which to expand lawyer
liability for consequential damages in legal malpractice suits exposing lawyers
to more liability than other tortfeasors is unfair.
The fourth rationale employed in refusing to deduct attorney's fees
from legal malpractice damage awards, based on the public policy objective
of deterring breaches of the attorney-client relationship, 74 also is an inap-

propriate blanket exception to the American Rule.7 s Like the rationale that
disallows the offset because of the defendant attorney's negligence, the use
of the public policy approach also overcompensates plaintiffs. 76 Furthermore,
the public policy exception punishes lawyers solely because of their status

as lawyers.77 Although some legal malpractice involves an egregious breach
of trust or an ethical violation, no reason exists to justify a per se rule
barring all legal malpractice defendants from offsetting fees from the
judgments against them. Although the court employing the public policy
exception posited that the special nature of the lawyer-client relationship
and the lawyer's unique role in the vindication of client rights justify this
differing treatment, 78 the court does not apply this exception to other
79
situations involving breaches of trust or even to other professionals.

Moreover, if the purpose of the public policy theory is to deter breaches
of the lawyer-client relationship, a blanket application is inappropriate
because nothing can deter malpractice that merely is negligent or unintentional. s0

73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (emphasizing courts' desire not to penalize
litigants).
74. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (outlining public policy rationale for
court's refusal to offset defendant attorney's fees from damages in legal malpractice cases).
75. See Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 48, 556 N.Y.S.2d
239, 245, 555 N.E.2d 611, 617 (1990) (Simons, J., dissenting) (complaining that practical effect
of refusal to offset fees on the public policy rationale is to make lawyer's malpractice liability
far above that of other professionals).
76. See id. at 48, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 245, 555 N.E.2d at 617 (criticizing court's refusal to
award offset of defendant's fees for underlying legal matter because refusal resulted in plaintiff's
overcompensation); see also supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (criticizing refusal to
offset defendant attorney's*fees for underlying legal matter because refusal results in plaintiff's
overcompensation).
77. See Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 48, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 245, 555 N.E.2d at 616 (noting
that public policy exception to American Rule treats legal malpractice differently from other
torts).
78. See id. at 48, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 245, 555 N.E.2d at 614 (recognizing that lawyer's
unique role justifies treating legal malpractice differently from other torts).
79. See id. at 48, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 245, 555 N.E.2d at 617 (Simons, J., dissenting)
(noting that court, in refusing to allow defendant attorney to offset fees from damage award,
treats lawyers differently from other professionals); cf. SRr, AN ACCOUNTANT'S GUIDE TO
MALPRA TiCE LiLABrry 73-75 (1979) (noting that normal tort and contract principles apply in
accounting malpractice); J. DAvIEs, CPA LiABnn=: A MANUAL FOR PRACTnONERS 165 (1983)
(commenting that courts treat accounting malpractice as common law tort or contract problem).
80. See PROSSER & KE TON, supra, note 36 at 9 (recognizing that although primary
purpose of tort law is compensation, deterrence is valid goal in limited instances); Restatement
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Courts apply the four rationales for refusing to award offsets to
defendants in legal malpractice actions despite the rationales' analytical
weaknesses. 8' Additionally, the courts provide little reasoning to clarify their
refusal to award offsets.8 2 Some courts and commentators speculate that
the decisions in which courts refuse to credit offsets to legal malpractice
defendants reflects an undercurrent of increased sympathy for aggrieved
clients as opposed to other plaintiffs.83 Other courts either imply or openly
state that the real reason underlying the refusal is the need to punish lawyer
misconduct. 4 Interestingly, some of the courts that purport to apply the

American Rule strictly in legal malpractice actions will find another basis
for awarding the fees. 85
Courts' frustration with lawyer incompetence and unethical behavior is
understandable. Refusal to award offsets to legal malpractice defendants,

however, is an ineffective way to address negligent malpractice because
negligence in a specific situation cannot be deterred. 86 Although awards of
attorney's fees might act as an institutional deterrent by encouraging a
generally higher standard of care in the legal profession, compensatory
damages probably suffice for that purpose. 87 Moreover, because the primary

of Torts, supra note 36 at § 901 comment c (stating that secondary purpose of tort law is
deterrence).
81. See supra notes 36-79 and accompanying text (explaining weaknesses of four approaches courts take toward offsets).
82. See Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 47-48, 555 N.E.2d at 616 (Simons, J., dissenting)
(criticizing logical consistency of public policy exception); Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d
1105, 1110-11 (Ist Cir. 1987) (questioning logic of "canceling out" and negligent lawyer
justifications and specifically refusing to determine validity of the consequential damage
approach).
83. See Moores, 834 F.2d at 1110 (citing other offset cases to stand for proposition that
"one victimized by legal malpractice should be more generously treated."); MEISELMAN, supra
note I at 59 (suggesting that some courts refusing to award offset to defendant do so out of
sympathy because wronged client had to vindicate rights through two lawsuits).
84. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (outlining public policy for courts
refusal to award offset to legal malpractice defendants); supra notes 21-25 and accompanying
text (outlining cases in which courts attempt to punish negligent attorney by refusing to award
fee).
85. See Jenkins v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 393 So. 2d 851, 859 (La. Ct. App.
1981) (holding that although plaintiff generally may not recover attorney's fees for prosecution
of legal malpractice action, plaintiff may recover fees above those of the original attorney if
incurred because of the original attorney's misconduct), affl'd, 422 So. 2d 1109 (La. 1982);
Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Trial Within a Trial-A CriticalAnalysis of Unique
Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MaRQ. L. R¢Ev. 40, 43-44 n.24 (1989) (noting that
although Jenkins court claimed that it was not violating rule against recovery of attorney's
fees, court's reasoning for awarding $5,000 excess legal fees to plaintiff may have been attempt
at disguising the real reason for its action).
86. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (outlining cases based on punishing
negligent attorney).
87. See Moores v. Greenberg, 834 F.2d 1105, 1114 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that compensatory damage awards, in concert with possibility of other damages in appropriate cases, is
adequate to deter malpractice).
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purpose of tort law is compensation," courts should reserve use of attorney's
fee awards to deter intentional bad faith conduct.8 9 Absent bad faith conduct
that falls under that specific exception to the American Rule, courts should
not punish lawyers in a civil suit.9
Other adequate means besides use of attorney's fee awards exist to
address courts' general concerns about retribution for unethical conduct. 9'
Although a lawyer's conduct in the events underlying a malpractice suit
may be unethical under a state's code of professional ethics, the proper
place for retributive punishment is before the bar disciplinary committee,
not before a court in a post trial proceeding. 92 The courts' use of an ethical
standard for awarding attorney's fees is inappropriate in the context of a
tort or contract case unless the plaintiff can show that the defendant's
violation of that standard constituted bad faith.9 3 When the plaintiff shows
an ethical breach that constituted bad faith conduct, however, the court
properly may award attorney's fees as part of a punitive measure to deter
that conduct in the future.9 4
Admittedly, courts should punish certain ethical rule violations that are
related to legal malpractice to provide a deterrent effect. Although simple
negligence accounts for some malpractice suits, 9 other suits involve intentional misconduct 96 such as representation of clients despite conflicts of
interest. 97 Much of the misconduct involved in malpractice suits violates the

88. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting compensatory purpose behind
damage awards).
89. See infra notes 101-28 and accompanying text (discussing cases that address bad faith

exception).
90. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (indicating that primary purpose of damage
awards is to compensate, rather than punish).
91. See Weston, Court-OrderedSanctions of Attorneys: A Concept That Duplicates the
Role of Attorney Disciplinary Procedures, 94 DIcK. L. REv. 897, 927 (1990) (asserting that
bar disciplinary committees are proper place for lawyer discipline, rather than proceedings in
which courts award attorney's fees as sanctions).
92. See id. (submitting that courts, in ordering more sanctions, step into role better
assumed by bar disciplinary committees).
93. See infra notes 143-66 and accompanying text (establishing connection between ethical
breaches and bad faith).
94. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (establishing deterrence rationale for
bad faith exception).
95. See CHAIcTmss'cs, supra note 1 at 581 (indicating that forty percent of malpractice

claims reported in study occurred because of administrative errors, such as failure to file or
client relation errors, such as failure to follow instructions); J. SMrri,

PREVENTING LEGAL

2-13 (1981) (asserting that common negligence is a leading cause of malpractice
actions); MEISaN, supra note I.at 339-42 (same).
96. See Caa.AcmRiusnics, supra note 1 at 581- (indicating that intentional wrongs and
substantive errors (both of which categories include professional misconduct) accounted for
over fifty percent of all malpractice claims reported for study); MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note
1 at 271-72 (establishing connection between legal malpractice and ethical violation); MEISELmAN,
supra note I at 285 (same).
MALPRAcncE

97. See Hazard, Conflicts Are Often Key in Malpractice, 12 NATONAL L.J. 13, 14 (Sept.

10, 1990) (indicating that conflict of interest may create presumption that actions giving rise
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states' codes of professional ethics. 98 However, courts do not need to deny
offsets to legal malpractice defendants to deter these ethical violations.99
Instead, courts may award attorney's fees as damages to successful legal
malpractice plaintiffs under the bad faith exception to the American Rule.' °°
Intentional lawyer misconduct in violation of ethical standards fits under
this exception.' 0' Using the bad faith exception courts can punish the
attorney, thereby deterring future misconduct while still complying with the
basic common law rules stressing compensation'02 and the principles underlying the American Rule. 03
Despite general acceptance of the American Rule, both federal and state
courts recognize exceptions to the Rule that allow courts to award fees in
limited instances. °4 These exceptions to the Rule involve either the inherent

to malpractice suit were designed to protect conflicting interests of other client); MAUE1N &
LEVIT, supra note I at 238-40 (asserting that conflicts of interest are leading cause of ethically
based malpractice suits); MEISELMAN, supra note 1 at 285 (same).

98. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (indicating connection between ethical
misconduct and legal malpractice).
99. See supra notes 21-35 and accompanying text (outlining offset cases).
100. See infra notes 143-66 and accompanying text (establishing connection between ethical
misconduct and bad faith).
101. Id.
102. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (establishing compensation as primary
purpose for damage awards).
103. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text (outlining policies behind American
Rule).
104. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59 (1975)
(reiterating exceptions to rule, including bad faith exception); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718-21 (1967) (clarifying exceptions to American Rule while
holding award of attorney's fees improper in trademark infringement suit under Lanham Act,
15 U.S.C.A. § 1117). In Fleischmann the United States Supreme Court considered the question
of whether a plaintiff could recover attorney's fees as separate damages in situations where a
statute specifies the compensatory remedies. 386 U.S. at 714-15. After discussion of the historic
justification for the American Rule, the Court recognized four limited exceptions to the general
rule prohibiting awards of attorney's fees, derived from the historic powers of courts sitting
in equity to manage their internal affairs and correct situations of manifest injustice. Id.at
718-19. However, the Court found that the exceptions were not developed to supplement
statutory remedies passed by legislatures. Id. at 719. Accordingly, the Court held that the
attorney's fees were unrecoverable. Id. at 721.
The first exception the Fleischmann Court recognized occurs in cases involving bad faith
or wanton conduct on the part of the losing party. Id. at 718. The second exception covers
awards for damages resulting from a party's willful failure to abide by court orders. Id. The
third exception addressed by the Court in Fleischmann applies to "common fund" cases in
which a plaintiff has, through litigation at his own expense, created a situation from which
many others in a given class will benefit, making it inequitable for that plaintiff to bear the
cost alone. Id. The fourth exception, similar to the third, comes into effect when a plaintiff
unintentionally creates a "common fund" situation by instituting a suit which, by effect of
the court's judgment, will benefit others in a given class. Id.
The Supreme Court consistently has reaffirmed the exceptions it enumerated in Fleischmann. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 257-258 (recognizing exceptions, but finding
that none applied in case); F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417
U.S. 116, 129-30 (1974) (enumerating exceptions and refusing to apply them); Hall v. Cole,
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equitable powers of the court 10 5 or statutory grants of authority, such as
state and federal rules of civil procedure. '1 6 One well-recognized exception
is that of "bad faith" or "obdurate behavior."1 0'7 Under the bad faith

412 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (listing exceptions while upholding trial court's award).
State courts also recognize exceptions to the American Rule based on the historical power
of equity courts. See Guay v. Brotherhood Bld'g Assoc., 87 N.H. 216, 177 A. 409, 413 (1935)
(denying defendant's claim for attorney's fees because situation did not fit into exceptions to
American Rule). Guay revolved around the plaintiff's testatrix' premature foreclosure on the
defendant's property. The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that although the foreclosure
was illegal, the defendant was not entitled to counsel costs because the case did not fit into
the exceptions to the American Rule recognized in New Hampshire. Id. at 216, 177 A. at 413.
Like the United States Supreme Court, the New Hampshire court cast its exceptions almost
entirely in terms of the court's authority to enforce the court's decisions and do justice where
equity requires. Id., 177 A. at 413.
State courts most commonly allow attorney's fees in situations in which the award is
either necessary for the court to run properly, as in the example of punishment for wilful
disobedience of a court order, or as a condition for the grant of a new trial. See Guay at 413
(noting exception). On other occasions the award is motivated by equitable considerations,
such as cases in which a contract provides for such damages, "common fund" situations and
domestic relations cases. See id. (noting common fund and domestic relations exceptions);
Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18 A.D.2d 331, 239 N.Y.S.2d 792, 799-800 (1963) (holding award of
attorney's fees to wrongfully expelled union members out of union fund proper because their
actions benefitted all union members); C M & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 79596 (Del. 1982) (recognizing and applying common fund exception); Gilbert v. Hoisting &
Portable Engineers, 237 Or. 130, 141, 390 P.2d 320 (1964) (recognizing and applying common
benefit exception); Turnipseed v. Turnipseed, 158 So. 2d 808, 812-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963) (recognizing exception in divorce case, but refusing to apply); Barber v. Barber, 234
Miss. 89, 92, 105 So.2d 630, 631-32 (1958) (recognizing and applying exception in domestic
relations case).
105. See Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (recognizing inherent powers of court
to grant attorney's fee awards), reh'g denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962).
106. See Western United Realty v. Issacs, 679 P.2d 1063, 1064-65 (Colo. 1984) (recognizing
grant of power to award fees under state rule of civil procedure).
107. See Vaughn, 369 U.S. at 530 (holding award of attorney's fees to injured sailor for
non payment of cure and maintenance proper as part of compensatory damages). Later courts
cited Vaughn to stand for the proposition that federal courts had the inherent power to award
attorney's fees in cases involving bad faith. See, e.g, Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752 (1980) (citing Vaughn and reaffirming court's inherent authority to award fees in
bad faith cases while remanding to District Court for a finding of whether party's actions
constituted bad faith); Aleyska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258 (citing Vaughn while noting bad
faith exception); F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129 (citing Vaughn to stand for recognition of bad
faith exception).
Most state courts also recognize the bad faith exception to the American Rule. See, e.g.,
Western United Realty, 679 P.2d at 1065 (stating that, when bad faith or frivolousness is
present, rationale for awarding attorney's fees under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure § 1317-101 becomes even stronger than usual); Jackson v. Brinegar, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 432, 436,
301 S.E.2d 493, 497-98 (1983) (holding instruction allowing jury to award attorney's fees
proper where suit involves possibility of bad faith behavior); Shanks v. Williams, 455 A.2d
450, 452 (Md. App. 1983) (upholding award of attorney's fees on other grounds, but recognizing
that bad faith exception also applied to case); Payne v. Foley, 102 Id. 760, 761-62, 639 P.2d
1126, 1127-28 (1982) (recognizing bad faith exception but refusing to apply it); Cox v. Ubik,
424 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ind. App. 1981) (upholding equitable power of court to award attorney's
fees in bad faith cases); Colonial Carpets, Inc. v. Carpet Fair, Inc., 374 A.2d 419, 424-25
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exception a court properly may award the fees incurred during litigation of
a suit or motion based on bad faith behavior to the victims of that
08
behavior.1
The bad faith exception to the American Rule provides a legitimate
justification for an award of attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff in legal
malpractice actions involving intentional or wanton misconduct. In federal
courts the bad faith exception to the American Rule allows a trial court to

assess attorney's fees against a party who "has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons,"' 9 either in the actions underlying the litigation or during the conduct of the lawsuit." 0 A problem with

applying the bad faith exception, however, is that bad faith is an extremely
difficult term to define and is even harder to apply as a standard for
awarding attorney's fees."' The definition of bad faith is problematic
because the definition suggests that any intentional tort a party commits
involves bad faith. The fact that courts often disagree on the issue of

whether a party acted in bad faith when considering an award of attorney's
fees underscores the definitional difficulty." 2 Despite this shortcoming,
courts use the bad faith exception to justify awards of attorney's fees in a
wide variety of cases."'

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (finding justification for award in bad faith cases under Md. Civ.
Pro. 64(b)); Sorin v. Board of Educ., 46 Ohio St. 2d 177, 180, 347 N.E.2d 527, 530-31 (Ohio
1976) (recognizing bad faith exception but refusing to apply to facts of case); New Jersey
Turnpike Auth. v. Bayonne Barrel.& Drum Co., 110 N.J. Super. 506, 514, 266 A.2d 164,
167-68 (1970) (finding that bad faith is apiplicable for use against state in appeals from
condemnation proceedings); Cooper v. Weissblatt, 154 Misc. 522, 528-30, 277 N.Y.S. 709,
717-18 (1935) (holding counsel's fees recoverable for plaintiff in fraud case on compensatory
damage theory because of bad faith inherent in defendant's fraudulent conduct); Carhart v.
Wainman, 114 Ga. 632, 633, 40 S.E. 781, 782 (1902) (authorizing jury's award of attorney's
fees upon finding of bad faith).
108. See Vaughn, 369 U.S. at 527 (recognizing connection between bad faith and compensation).
109. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 766 (quoting 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTncE, at
1709 (2d ed. 1972)) (quoting requirements for attorney's fee award under bad faith exception);
F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129 (reviewing exceptions to American Rule).
110. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 15 (holding that court may find bad faith either in conduct
leading to litigation or in actions during lawsuit).
111. See Black's Law Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990) (defining bad faith as "[t]he opposite
of 'good faith' and further clarifying by adding that term, "bad faith", implies "the
conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity"). Courts often
disagree about what action constitutes bad faith. See Bell v. School Board, 321 F.2d 494, 500
(4th Cir. 1963) (holding, over two justices' dissents, attorney's fees awardable to successful
plaintiffs in school desegregation case under bad faith exception to American Rule where
defendant school board showed long pattern of racially discriminatory practices and deliberately
placed administrative obstacles in plaintiffs' path during attempt to desegregate schools);
Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 534 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (contending that court
should remand case to trial court because shipowner's failure to provide cure and maintenance
did not automatically constitute bad faith).
112. See supra note Ill and accompanying text (indicating difficulty in defining bad
faith).
113. See McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding award of

1991]

INTENTIONAL LA WYER MISCONDUCT

1159

The bad faith cases fall into two basic classes: cases involving breach
of a well-defined duty and cases involving intentional deprivation of a wellestablished right. 1 4 The first group consists of cases in which the defendant
owed a clearly established duty to the plaintiff and neglected that duty in
a wanton manner." 5 Vaughn v. Atkinson," 6 the first case in which the
United States Supreme Court openly recognized the bad faith exception to
the American Rule, fails into this category. The defendant shipowner in
Vaughn had a well-established duty towards the plaintiff to provide "cure
and maintenance" in the event of injury." 7 When the plaintiff, a sailor,
attempted to collect the cure and maintenance after becoming ill the shipowner made no effort to determine the validity of the plaintiff's claim." 8
The shipowner's inaction forced the plaintiff to hire a lawyer to litigate the
plaintiff's claim." 9 The United States Supreme Court held that the shipowner's failure to begin an investigation into the sailor's claim constituted
bad faith sufficient to justify an award of attorney's fees. 20 Furthermore,

attorney's fees justified when plaintiff, discharged college professor, had to litigate to obtain
statement of reasons for nonrenewal of his employment contract with defendant state college).
In McEnteggart, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts alleging arbitrary and capricious nonrenewal of his employment contract, and
demanding a statement of reasons for the nonrenewal. Id. at 1110. The United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the nonrenewal was justified and affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the action. Id. at 1111-12. However, the court also found that plaintiff
was constitutionally entitled to a statement of reasons under a previous decision and awarded
attorney's fees on the ground that the school had failed to provide that statement after several
requests. Id. at 1112.
Plaintiffs in race discrimination suits also used the bad faith exception with particular
success. See Bell, 321 F.2d at 500 (applying bad faith exception to allow award of attorney's
fees to plaintiffs in school desegregation case); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 186
F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) (refusing to disturb lower court's award of lawyer's fees to
successful plaintiffs in race discrimination suit against union and railroad).
114. See infra notes 115-28 and accompanying text (explaining two classes of bad faith
cases).
115. See infra 116-23 and accompanying text (describing cases in which court infers bad
faith through breach of clearly established duty).
116. See Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (holding award of attorney's fees to
injured sailor for nonpayment of cure and maintenance proper as part of compensatory
damages), reh'g denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962). The plaintiff in Vaughn, an injured seaman,
attempted to obtain cure and maintenance from his ship's owner after showing symptoms of
tuberculosis. Id. at 528. The owner made no attempt to investigate the validity of the claim
and circumstances eventually forced the plaintiff to hire an attorney for a fifty percent
contingency fee to recover the cure and maintenance. Id.. The Court first recognized that an
award of attorney's fees was allowable under the traditional equity jurisdiction of admiralty
courts because the employer clearly acted in bad faith. Id. at 530. However, the Court went
on to hold that the fees were recoverable in this case as a normal element of compensatory
damages, reasoning that but for the shipowner's refusal to give the required maintenance and
cure the seaman would not have been forced to hire an attorney. Id. at 530.
117. Id. at 528.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 530.
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the Court added that the award of attorney's fees was proper as an element
of consequential damages caused by the shipowner's bad faith. 12 1 Thus, the
bad faith exception reflects the Court's judgment not only that obdurate
behavior warrants punishment, but also that victims of bad faith behavior
deserve full compensation and that courts should not hinder victim's full
recovery by mechanically applying the American Rule. Lower federal and
state courts have recognized this aspect of the bad faith exception as part
of the fabric of the American common law' 22 and apply the exception in
cases when a party's failure to perform an unambiguous, legally imposed
duty forces the opposing party to hire counsel and resort to legal action to
23
force the obliged party to perform that duty.1
The second category of bad faith cases involves intentional conduct that
deprives someone of a right to which that person clearly is entitled. 24 Bell
v. School Boara' 2 and Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 126 fall into the
second category. Both cases involved overt acts of race discrimination in

121. Id.
122. Cinciarelli v. Reagan, 556 F. Supp. 99, 100 (D.D.C. 1983) (stating that bad faith
exception is part of "American Common Law"), aff'd in pertinent part, rev'd in part, 729
F.2d 801, 804-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (granting fees to successful plaintiff on statutory grounds);
Cox v. Ubik, 424 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ind. App. 1981) (finding power to award fees under
traditional equitable principles).
123. See Cinciarelli, 556 F. Supp. at 100 (specifying standard for applying American
Rule). In Cinciarelli,the court found that the bad faith exception to the American Rule applied
when "a party, confronted with a clear statutory duty towards another, is so recalcitrant in
performing that duty that the injured party is forced to undertake unnecessary litigation to
vindicate plain legal rights." Id. (quoting Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 545 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D.D.C.
1982).
124. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (explaining class of cases in which
court infers bad faith from intentional deprivation of right).
125. 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963) (ordering award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs in
school desegregation case). In Bell the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
considered the issue of whether plaintiffs in a school desegregation case were entitled to recover
attorney's fees under the bad faith exception to the American Rule. Id. The county school
board in Bell effectively forced the plaintiffs to sue for desegregation of the county school by
forcing the plaintiffs to go through unnecessary application processes and threatening to close
down certain county schools. Id. at 495-97. The Fourth Circuit found that these actions clearly
constituted bad faith. Id. at 500. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
refusal to award attorney's fees to the successful plaintiffs. Id.
126. 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) (holding award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs in
race discrimination suit alleging discrimination against blacks in collective bargaining process
appropriate under bad faith exception to American Rule). In Rolax the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the question whether plaintiffs in a race
discrimination suit could properly recover attorney's fees incurred in that action. Id. The
defendants in Rolax, a union and a railroad company, entered into a collective bargaining
agreement that sacrificed the seniority rights of the black workers to those of white workers.Id. at 475-77. Although the railroad and union attempted to justify this action by pointing to
a need for more qualified firemen on trains who could be promoted to engineers, the court
said that the defendants' actions were merely a facade for a racially discriminatory system of
employment. Id. at 477. Consequently, the court found that the lower court's assessment of
attorney's fees against the defendant was appropriate. Id. at 481.
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the face of clearly defined constitutional prohibitions. 2 7 The courts in these
cases awarded attorney's fees because of the overt conduct on the part of
the defendants in the face of clear legal prohibitions that deprived the

respective plaintiffs of rights that courts clearly defined in previous race
discrimination cases.'2
These two classes of cases demonstrate that the bad faith exception has
two aspects. First, the bad faith exception is punitive, but only in that its
intent is to deter certain types of misconduct. 29 The purpose of an award
under the bad faith exception is not to punish a party for the sake of
exacting retribution. 30 If the bad faith exception is retributive in nature,
then courts could award attorney's fees in any intentional tort case. This
exception recognizes that certain types of behavior are so reprehensible that

the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party is necessary to deter that
conduct.' Additionally, the bad faith exception has a compensatory element. 3 2 The court awards the attorney's fees to compensate the wronged
party because of the damage caused by his opponent's bad faith conduct.
Thus, the compensatory aspect of the bad faith exception reflects the court's

decision that victims of bad faith behavior deserve not only the usual
compensation, but also reimbursement for attorney's fees incurred as a
result of the bad faith behavior.' 33
Because the standards for what constitutes bad faith behavior set out
previously are not always clear, 3 trial courts may have a difficult time
applying those standards. Whether bad faith exists in a case depends on
the specific facts of that case. Accordingly, the power to award attorney's
127. See Bell, 321 F.2d at 498-99 (finding clear constitutional violation on part of school
board); Rolax, 186 F.2d at 480 (finding constitutional violation on part of union and railroad).
128. See Bell, 321 F.2d at 499. The Bell court defined bad faith conduct in the context
of intentional behavior as conduct which "would in any other context be instantly recognized
as discreditable". Id. The court added that the equitable remedy "would be far from complete,
and justice would not be contained, if counsel fees were not awarded in a case so extreme."
Id.
129. See Cox v. Ubik, 424 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Ind. App. 1981) (recognizing two-fold

punitive and compensatory nature of rule); Hail v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (stating that
underlying rationale of rule coming from "bad faith" class of cases is punitive, to deter
certain types of conduct).
130. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 5 (stressing importance of bad faith exception as deterrent to
future misconduct); Cox, 424 N.E.2d at 129 (same).
131. See Hall, 412 U.S. at 5 (recognizing deterrent effect of bad faith exception); Cox,
424 N.E.2d at 129 (same).
132. See Cox, 424 N.E.2d at 129 (stressing compensatory aspect of bad faith exception);
Bell v. School Board, 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963) (recognizing that attorney's fees are
necessary to fully compensate victims of bad faith racial discrimination); Vaughn v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962) (awarding attorney's fees as damages to compensate for bad faith
conduct); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R, 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) (recognizing
that remedy would be incomplete in bad faith case without attorney's fee award).
133. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text (noting compensatory aspect of bad

faith exception).
134. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (suggesting definitional difficulties in

determining bad faith).
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fees is vested in the discretion of the trial court.' 35 A reviewing court will
overturn a trial court's attorney's fee award only if an abuse of discretion
existed in the trial court. 36 The policy of deference to the trial court's
award of attorney's fees leaves the trial court free to make decisions about
whether to award attorney's fees on a case by case basis.
Because of its deterrent and compensatory aspects, as well as the fact
that courts administer it with wide discretion, the bad faith exception is
similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11), which provides for
sanctions in the form of attorney's fees against parties filing frivolous
pleadings. 37 Although Rule 11 is a statutory rather than inherent base of
power, it serves the same purpose as the bad faith exception. 13 8 First, Rule
11 deters attorney misconduct by punishing frivolous pleadings. 139 Also,
Rule 11 compensates those parties forced to come to court to answer those
pleadings. 40 The bad faith exception has the same dual purpose. First, the
bad faith exception deters certain types of behavior.' 4' Also, the exception
compensates the victims of that behavior as part of the punitive transaction. 42 An understanding of the dual nature of the bad faith exception is
necessary to apply that standard in legal malpractice actions.
Certain types of legal malpractice fit into the bad faith exception because
they constitute violations of the ethical codes that govern the legal profes-

135. See C M & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 795-96 (Del. 1982) (noting that
award of attorney's fees is soundly in discretion of trial court); LaSalle Nat'l Bkc. v. Brodsky,
51 111. App. 2d 260, 201 N.E.2d 208, 208-09 (1964) (deferring to trial court on issue of whether
to award attorney's fees); Gilbert v. Hoisting & Portable Engineers, 237 Or. 130, 141, 390
P.2d 320, 321 (1964) (same); Turnipseed v. Turnipseed, 158 So. 2d 808, 812-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963) (same); Barber v. Barber, 234 Miss. 89, 92, 105 So. 2d 630, 631-32 (1958) (same).
136. See CM & M Group, 453 A.2d at 796 (refusing to overturn trial court's award of
attorney's fees absent abuse of discretion); Turnipseed, 158 So.2d at 813 (holding that, absent
abuse of discretion, appellate court would not overturn award of attorney's fees); Barber, 234
Miss. at 92, 105 So.2d at 632 (same).
137. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states:
[]If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule [requiring
that the signer have made a good faith investigation into the facts and law to ensure
their accuracy and truth and that the signer not file motions to harass or delay],
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (recognizing purpose of Rule 11
as discouraging frivolous pleadings).
139. Id.
140. Id. (indicating intent to provide compensation for those forced to answer frivolous
pleadings).
141. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (stressing deterrent effect of bad faith
exception).
142. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (stressing compensatory aspect of bad
faith exception).
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sion.' 4 A lawyer enters the profession on notice that he is subject to an
ethical code.44 The two major ethical codes, along with courts' interpretive

decisions, define a lawyer's duty of loyalty toward his client.' 45 Courts can
analogize a lawyer's duty to a client to duties owed by parties in other bad
147
faith cases.46 For example, the defendant's duty in Vaughn v. Atkinson

to at least investigate the validity of the plaintiff's claim for cure and
maintenance was unequivocal.' 4 In the same way, a lawyer has a duty to
represent a client within the bounds of the governing ethical code. 149 Given
the context of the attorney-client relationship, certain breaches of the ethical
codes should constitute bad faith conduct under that exception to the

American Rule.' 50 The attorney's role with regard to the client is multifaceted-he may act as an agent, fiduciary, and trustee as well as a number
of other roles implicating ethical standards.' 5' The major elements of this
relationship are confidence and loyalty on the part of the lawyer. 5 2 When
deciding whether to treat legal malpractice as bad faith, courts must distin-

guish between the type of legal malpractice that may warrant award of
attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs and the type of malpractice that would

not warrant such treatment.

143. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1990); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY (1989). The American Bar Association promulgated the Model
Rules and Model Code to provide a standard for states to set for lawyer conduct. Model
Rules, Introduction at 12. The legislatures or courts of all fifty states have adopted the Model

Code or Model Rules as their standard for lawyer conduct. Model Rules, Introduction at 14.
144. See G. HAZARD & S. Komix, TEE LAw AND ETIcs OF LAwYERINO at xxi (1989)
(recognizing that law schools must require law students to take a course in Professional
Responsibility to gain American Bar Association accreditation).
145. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1990); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLrrY (1981).
146. See supra notes 114-123 and accompanying text (defining requirement of duty for
finding of bad faith upon breach).

147. See Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 528, reh'g denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962). In
Vaughn the United States Supreme Court recognized that the defendant, a shipowner, had a
clear and unequivocal duty to investigate the claim of the plaintiff, a sailor, for cure and

maintenance. Id. The Court held that failure to make this investigation constituted bad faith.
Id. at 530.
148. See id. at 528 (indicating that defendant's duty toward plaintiff was well-established).
149. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble (1990) (asserting lawyer's
high duty towards client); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, Canon 2 (1981)
(same).
150. See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text (outlining requirements for bad faith
exception to apply).

151. See Fielding v. Brebbia, 399 F.2d 1003, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that attorney
has fiduciary duty toward client). Yanchor v. Kagan, 22 Cal. App. 3d 544, 99 Cal. Rptr. 367,
369 (1971) (holding client is bound by attorney's agreement because attorney acts as client's
agent); In Re Adams, 737 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Mo. 1987) (applying trustee principles to attorneyclient relationship); Campagnola v. Mulholland, Minion & Roe, 76 N.Y.2d 38, 43-44, 556
N.Y.S.2d 239, 243, 555 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1990) (espousing general confidential nature of
attorney-client relationship).
152. See Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 43-44, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 243, 555 N.E.2d at 614
(stressing importance of lawyer's loyalty and client's confidence in attorney).
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The justification for treating legal malpractice cases stemming from
ethical violations differently from other types of tortious conduct comes
largely from the unique nature of the lawyer-client relationship. 53 The

lawyer-client relationship involves representation in legal matters about
which a client may have little knowledge and over which the client may
have little or no control. The lawyer-client relationship, therefore, involves
a higher duty of confidence and trust on the part of the attorney with
regard to the client than other relationships from which causes of action
spring.15 4 Both ethical codes for lawyers underscore the special nature of
this relationship. 55 A client should not have to litigate to enjoy those rights

inherent in the attorney-client relationship that the ethical codes reflect.
When a lawyer commits malpractice by intentionally breaching an ethical
provision that protects the client, the lawyer acts in bad faith because he
violates a well-defined standard. 156 An effective way to deter bad faith
breaches of ethical standards and fully compensate its victims is to award
57
attorney's fees to successful legal malpractice plaintiffs.'

Courts can make a proper analogy between legal malpractice and other
types of bad faith behavior such as that described in Bell v. School Board158
and Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R..159 The Rolax court applied the bad

faith exception when a union entered into a racially discriminatory contract
with a railroad against constitutional prohibitions and the Bell court similarly
was willing to apply the bad faith exception when the defendant school

board, by placing administrative obstacles in the path of the plaintiffs,
attempted to evade compliance with the United States Supreme Court's
153. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rules 1.7-1.8 (1990) (imposing duty
on lawyer to avoid conflicts of interest); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsBmirrY Canon
5 (1981) (same).
154. See Campagnola, 76 N.Y.2d at 43, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42, 555 N.E.2d at 614. The
Campagnola court stated:
[t]he unique relationship between an attorney and client, founded in principle upon
the elements of trust and confidence on the part of the client and of undivided
loyalty and devotion on the part of the attorney, remains one of the most sensitive
and confidential relationships in our society.
Id. (quoting Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553, 556, 444 N.Y.S.2d 55,
428 N.E.2d 387 (1981)).
155. See id. (relying on ethical code to underscore special nature of attorney-client
relationship).
156. See supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text (establishing breach of well defined
duty as bad faith).
157. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (explaining dual deterrent and compensatory rationales for bad faith exception).
158. See Bell v. School Board, 321 F.2d 484, 491 (4th Cir. 1963) In Bell the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the defendant's attempts to thwart the
plaintiffs' progress toward a racially integrated school system constituted bad faith and
accordingly ordered an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. Id.
159. 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) (holding award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs in
race discrimination case proper under bad faith exception to American Rule). In Rolax the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that formation of a racially
discriminatory contract between a union and a railroad constituted bad faith and upheld the
trial court's award of fees under the bad faith exception to the American Rule. Id.
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constitutional dictates in the school desegregation decisions.:6 If noncompliance with court rulings that involve unclear constitutional issues constitutes bad faith behavior, then courts should also consider a failure to
comply with a fairly clear set of rules that outline a standard of conduct
for professionals to constitute bad faith conduct. Although ethical codes
are not completely clear, they are at least as clear as a series of courts'
constitutional decisions. Accordingly, intentional violation of ethical codes
should constitute bad faith conduct for the purpose of awarding attorney's
6
fees to victims of ethical code violations.1 1
The lawyer's ethical duty makes legal malpractice stemming from ethical
violations different from other torts.' 62 Courts often recognize the special
nature of the lawyer-client relationship in many contexts other than legal
malpractice actions. For example, most jurisdictions do not allow lawyers
to limit their liability for malpractice in employment contracts. 163 Furthermore, many courts will not allow lawyers in .a professional corporation to
take advantage of the corporate veil to evade responsibility for the tortious
actions of other corporation members. 64 In the same way, a lawyer has a

160. See Bell, 321 F.2d at 500 (applying bad faith exception to facts of school desegregation
suit); Rolax, 186 F.2d at 481 (applying bad faith exception in union discrimination suit).
161. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (noting dual compensatory and punitive
aspects of bad faith exception).
162. See supra notes 143-61 and accompanying text (establishing lawyer's duty toward
client as defined by ethical codes).
163. See MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT D.R. 6-102(A) (1981) (stating that
attorney may not limit malpractice liability in employment contract); MODEL RULES OF PROFEssIONAL Ra5poNsmIxrY Rule 1.8(h) (1990) (stating that attorney may limit malpractice liability
in employment contract only if potential client is represented by independent counsel).
164. See generally Annotation, Liability of Professional Corporation of Lawyers, or
IndividualMembers Thereof,for Malpractice or Other Tort of Another Member, 39 A.L.R.4th
556 (1985) (indicating courts' disagreement over whether individual members of professional
corporations for practice of law may be held liable for the tortious actions of other member).
Many states will not allow lawyers in firms to limit liability for malpractice committed
by another partner by using a corporate form for the firm. See First Bank & Trust Co. v.
Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1983) (holding lawyer in professional corporation
liable for professional misconduct of another lawyer in firm). In First Bank & Trust, defendant
Zagoria, the only fellow shareholder in defendant Stoner's professional corporation, issued
checks to clients in a real estate closing which were dishonored because of insufficient funds
in the corporation's checking account. Id. at 675. Stoner contended that he was not liable for
Zagoria's negligence because he was only a shareholder in the corporation, rather than Zagohia's
partner. Id. In reversing the Georgia Court of Appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court refused
to apply normal corporation law to the case and instead based its decision on the court's
authority to regulate the practice of law, also noting that law is a profession rather than a
commercial enterprise. Id. The court reasoned that because of the special considerations present
in a lawyer's relationship with clients and other lawyers in a firm "[lit is inappropriate for
the lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek in the folds of the corporate veil and thus escape
the responsibilities of professionalism." Id. Thus, the court held that a lawyer is liable for
the professional misconduct of other firms members regardless of whether the firm is a
partnership or a professional corporation. Id. at 676.
Some states have adopted rules about law firm incorporation similar to that of Georgia.
See Petition of the Bar Assoc. of Hawaii, 55 Haw. 121, 122, 516 P.2d 1267, 1268-70 (1973)
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higher duty of care to fulfill in his professional undertakings because of

the ethical rules.1 65 Hence, the lawyer involved in legal malpractice revolving
around a violation of ethical rules is in a different position from that of a
person who breaches a contract or runs someone down with an automobile
because the lawyer had notice that society expects an even higher standard
166
of care from lawyers than from citizens at large.

One might argue that this use of the bad faith exception is indistinguishable from the previously discussed public policy approach towards the
award of attorney's fees. 16 7 However, this approach differs from the public
policy exception in two respects. First, use of the bad faith exception allows

the court to find and punish the lawyer for his conduct in light of his status
as a professional rather than for his status alone. Also, application of the
bad faith standard, because it punishes conduct and serves to deter, punishes
only intentional or wanton misconduct. 68 The public policy exception, which

punishes the lawyer for his status, is overbroad.

69

Moreover, the public

policy exception is inequitable because it punishes all tortious behavior,
including negligence. 70 The bad faith exception, however, punishes only
7
intentional misconduct.' '
When applying the bad faith exception in legal malpractice cases, courts
must remember the crucial connection between intentional breaches of ethical
duties and bad faith. 72 The ethical codes do not purport to give rise to
causes of action upon their violation. 7 The standards nonetheless are useful

(adopting rule allowing law firms to incorporate, but specifying that incorporation would not
limit individual lawyers' liability for associates' malpractice); Street v. Sugerman, 202 So. 2d
749, 751 (Fla. 1967) (noting that "[t]he privilege of incorporation was ... not created ... in
order that those availing themselves of the benefits could be cloaked with an immunity inimical
to legal order and public interest."); In Re The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 557-59 (Fla.
1961) (granting State Bar's petition to allow law firms to operate as corporations, but refusing
to limit liability of lawyers in such corporations for professional misconduct of corporations'
other members). But see In Re Rhode Island Bar Assoc., 106 R.I. 752, 760, 263 A.2d 692,
696-97 (1970) (adopting rule making members of legal professional corporations not liable for
associates' malpractice, although the corporate entity would be liable to the extent of its
assets).
165. See supranotes 143-61 and accompanying text (asserting that ethical standards impose
duty on attorney).
166. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (establishing that lawyers have notice of
duty).
167. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (outlining public policy arguments for
not awarding offsets).
168. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (establishing bad faith exception in
cases involving intentional behavior).
169. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text (outlining public policy exception).
170. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (criticizing public policy exception).
171. See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text (explaining that bad faith exception
punishes only intentional conduct).
172. See supra notes 131-54 and accompanying text (establishing connection between
ethical violation and bad faith showing).
173. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble (1990) (stating that violation
of ethical standard does not give rise to a cause of action).
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guides for defining bad faith in malpractice actions because they define the
extent of a lawyer's duty to his client. 174 Moreover, the violation of or even
a conviction under the ethical code does not constitute the basis for the
malpractice action. Instead, the conduct that gave rise to the violation is
being used to establish that malpractice occurred. The conduct that gave
rise to a violation of the disciplinary rule also gave rise to the violation of
the bad faith standard for an award of attorney 's fees. Therefore, that
conduct is grounds for an award of attorney's fees under the bad faith
17
exception to the American Rule. 1
However, because the basis upon which the court may award attorneys
fees in legal malpractice actions is that of bad faith conduct, courts should
not award attorney's fees in situations involving simple negligence, such as
missing a statute of limitations or a filing deadline. 76 Rather, the courts
should concentrate on award of attorneys fees in situations involving a
lawyer's intentional or wantonly negligent breach of his duties of professional responsibility such as adverse representation, 77 breach of confidentiality, 7 1 or intentional mishandling of money in client's accounts. 7 9 In the
context of the attorney-client relationship, intentional breaches of these
codes constitute bad faith conduct, or at the very least, wanton negligence.8 0
These types of breaches of the various ethical codes constitute reasons for
awards of attorney's fees under the bad faith exception to the American
Rule. ' Moreover, application of a standard requiring intentional behavior
or wanton negligence to these conflict of interest situations falls squarely
within the bad faith exception to the American Rule. 8 2
When analyzing the possible uses of the bad faith exception in legal
malpractice suits, one might argue that penalizing an attorney for unwittingly
allowing a conflict to arise, 3 breaching confidentiality8 4 or commingling a

174. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (establishing in which ethical rules
establish duty toward client).
175. See supra notes 143-66 and accompanying text (establishing connection between
breach of ethical code and bad faith).
176. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (establishing bad faith exception in
cases involving intentional behavior).
177. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rules 1.7-1.9 (1990) (prohibiting
conflicts of interest); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REs OrNSmLITY, D.R. 5-501-5-106 (same).
178. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 (imposing duty to maintain
client confidences); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmIBlTr, D.R. 4-101 (same).
179. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1990) (requiring separate
maintenance of client's funds); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY D.R. 9-102 (1981)
(same).
180. See supra notes 143-166 and accompanying text (establishing connection between
ethical violation and bad faith).
181. See supra notes 143-66 and accompanying text (establishing connection between
ethical violations and bad faith).
182. See supra notes 143-66 and accompanying text (establishing connection between
ethical violations and bad faith).
183. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer's duty with regard to
conflicts of interest).
184. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer's duty of confidenti-
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client's funds with those of the attorney' s5 is unfair. The complicated nature
of the modern legal world makes situations that could give rise to ethical

breaches increasingly difficult to monitor. For example, the increase in the
number of large law firms has added to a rise in the number of conflicts
cases because conflicts have become more difficult to detect.'8 6 Large firms
now find themselves in the position of representing clients on both sides of

business transactions and litigation.' 7 Furthermore, involvement of law firms
in business deals with clients creates many possible conflicts.' Additionally,
lawsuits against clients motivated by business concerns, unpaid legal fees,

or other conflicts of interest are becoming increasingly common.'8

9

These

9

situations also have potential malpractice implications.' 0 From a practical

standpoint, however, the lawyer is more often than not in the best position
to ascertain whether or not a conflict of interest exists, prevent a breach
of confidentiality, or simply exercise enough discipline over himself and the

members of his firm to prevent the occurrence of problems with client's
funds. The client certainly is unable to help himself. Conflicts admittedly

are hard to detect sometimes.' 9' However, means exist by which attorneys
may discover conflicts.' 92 Furthermore, if one must choose between two
innocent parties the burden logically should fail on the attorney, who has
the knowledge and means at his disposal to avoid or remedy the problem,
rather than the innocent client. Thus, it is reasonable to hold attorneys
liable for the problems resulting from intentional professional misconduct.
To ensure equitable operation of the bad faith exception in legal

malpractice cases, courts also could create a rebuttable presumption of bad
184. See supra note 178 and- accompanying text (discussing lawyer's duty of confidentiality).

185. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing lawyer's duty to keep clients'
funds separate from those of firm).
186. See O'Malley, Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, 39 DEF. L.J. 25,

29-42 (1990) (noticing increasing trend toward lawyers in large firms entering business dealings
with clients, resulting in increased potential malpractice liability); MISEWA.Ns, supra note 1, at
289 (recognizing that large law firms create special malpractice problems).
187. See O'Malley, supra note 186, at 29 (noting increased tendency by firms to engage
in adverse representation, even if unwittingly); Glaberson, "A Question of Integrity at Bluechip Law Firms", 293 Bus. WK., April 7, 1986 at 76. (expressing concern over firms' tendency
to take clients despite conflicts); MEISELMAN, supra note 1, at 231 (same).
188. See O'Malley, supra note 186, at 29 (warning about malpractice implications of
dealing with clients); MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 1, at 229 (noting presumptive conflict that
arises upon dealing with client); MEISELMAN, supra note 1, at 340 (warning about engaging in
business dealings with clients).
189. See 0 'Malley, supra note 186, at 29 (noting potential malpractice implications of
suing clients); Smith, supra note 95, at 20 (same).
190. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (noting malpractice implications of suing
client).
191. See O'Malley, supra note 186, at 29. (conceding difficulty in detecting some conflicts
of interest); Smith, supra note 95, at 33 (same).
192. See 0 'Malley, supra note 186, at 51 (stating that large firms should have compre-

hensive conflict of interest data bases to avoid malpractice); Smith, supra note 95, at 33-39
(suggesting possible conflict of interest detection and protection system).
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faith that would arise upon a showing that an ethical violation occurred
that gave rise to the malpractice action. This rebuttable presumption would
give attorneys an opportunity to defend themselves against charges of bad
faith during post-trial hearings on attorney's fees. The defendant attorney
could rebut the bad faith presumption with a positive showing that he took
due care to avoid the problems arising from the misconduct by making
disclosure to the client, 93 constructing "Chinese Walls" 94 between firm
members where appropriate, or making a showing of due diligence or proper
office procedures in the case of commingled funds. 195 Courts engage in this
type of burden-shifting in cases in which the party to which the burden
shifts is in the best position to come forward with evidence to rebut the
presumption which arises. 9 6 For example, in most jurisdictions a contract
between attorney and client is presumptively voidable and the burden is on
the lawyer to overcome this presumption./97 Furthermore, when an attorney
benefits from taking a position antagonistic to the interests of a client, the
burden is on the lawyer to prove good faith rather than on the client to
prove lack of good faith. 9s Accordingly, the reasoning behind placing the
burden on the lawyer to come forward with evidence rebutting the presumption is that the lawyer is in the best position to know whether a
conflict exists. This burden-shifting allows for courts' equitable application
of the bad faith exception to the American Rule in legal malpractice cases.
The offset cases show how courts refusing to offset attorney's fees for
matters underlying malpractice judgments effectively award the attorney's
fees incurred in litigating the actual malpractice suit to plaintiffs in legal
malpractice actions.' 99 These indirect awards of attorney's fees operate
against basic common law principles of tort and contract and the American
Rule. 200 Use of the bad faith standard, however, is consistent with tort and
contract principles of compensation as well as the American Rule. 20 , Fur-

193. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.8 (1990) (allowing representation
despite conflict if client consents after consultation and agreement in which independent counsel
represents client).
194. See O'Malley, supra note 186, at 52 (describing Chinese Wall procedures).
195. See O'Malley, supra note 186, at 55 (describing process for keeping client's funds
separate from those of firm); Smith, supra note 95 at 19 (describing steps to be taken in
ensuring maintenance of fiduciary obligations).
196. See Fielding v. Brebbia, 130 U.S. App. D.C. 270, 399 F.2d 1003, 1005 (1968) (noting
that attorney more appropriately bears some burdens in litigation than client because he is in
best position to rebut presumptions); McFail v. Braden, 19 Ill. 2d 108, 166 N.E.2d 46, 51
(1960) (same); Kukla v. Perry, 361 Mich. 311, 105 N.W.2d 176, 178 (1960) (same).
197. See Fielding, 130 U.S. App. D.C. at 273, 399 F.2d at 1005 (shifting burden lack of
contract between attorney and client to attorney because attorney entered into contract with
client).
198. See id. at 1003 (shifting burden to attorney).
199. See supra notes 20-84 and accompanying text (describing and criticizing offset cases).
200. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing-compensatory purpose of
damage awards); supra notes 47-65 (explaining purpose of American Rule).
201. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing compensatory purpose of
tort and contract remedies); supra notes 47-65 (describing policies behind American Rule).
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thermore, use of the bad faith standard in legal malpractice actions is
compatible with the policies behind the American Rule because it does not

cause many of the problems that arise when courts assess attorney's fees to
the losing litigant. 20 2 This standard does not penalize the lawyer for defending

his suit, 20 3 rather, it penalizes the attorney for his bad faith conduct
underlying the litigation. 204 Any potential problems with an advocate's

independence and drawing out the litigation process are minimal. 20 1 Although
litigation over bad faith and attorney's fees would lengthen the trial slightly,
courts must already address the problems of fees in cases that presently fall
under the bad faith exception.2 The added burden to the court would be

insubstantial.
Use of the bad faith exception in legal malpractice cases also promotes
a higher ethical standard for attorneys because it deters unethical conduct. 2°7

The exception operates fairly as an ethical standard because it does not
punish lawyers who are negligent or overcompensate legal malpractice

.plaintiffs. 20 Furthermore, because the power to award attorney's fees is
exercised soundly in the trial court's discretion viewing all the circumstances

involved, the power allows the court to make the kind of fact specific
determinations necessary to determine bad faith conduct. 209 The trial court's
determinations, however, would be subject to appellate review to ensure
that they met the general guidelines previously set forth. 210 The definition
211

of bad faith defines the limits of the court's power to award fees.

Consequently, when a court exercises its power to award attorney's fees in
bad faith legal malpractice cases, that exercise has minimal erosive effect
on the American Rule.
Because the bad faith exception's basis is squarely in the court's inherent

equitable power, and because it addresses only bad faith situations, it

202. See supra 47-65 and accompanying text (discussing policies favoring American Rule).
203. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing policy of not penalizing litigants
for exercising right of access to judicial system).
204. See supra notes 143-71 and accompanying text (establishing connection between
ethical rules and bad faith conduct).
205. See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text (outlining policies behind American
Rule).
206. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (justifying American Rule because of eased
burden on courts).
207. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (discussing deterrent effect of sanctions).
208. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (noting overcompensation problems in
offset cases).
209. See Bell v. School Board, 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963) (reaffirming idea that
determination of bad faith is soundly in discretion of trial court, with appellate review restricted
to whether abuse of discretion occurred); see also supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text
(describing flexibility of bad faith standard because it is an exercise of equitable power).
210. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (noting that trial court's review is
limited to abuse of discretion).
211. See supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text (defining bad faith).
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punishes only those lawyers who are culpable. 2 12 It also appropriately serves
the purpose of compensating the plaintiff for having to sue because of
breach of a duty that is based on a relationship. 2 3 Finally, use of the bad
faith standard allows courts to address properly attorney misconduct without
engaging in elaborate construction of theories that allow a plaintiff to
recover indirectly his attorney's fees for the malpractice action. 214 Thus, the
conduct
bad faith exception enables courts to address a lawyer's egregious
215
on a case by case basis within a set of flexible guidelines.
MICHAEL C. MOORE

212. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (recognizing trial court's wide discretion in applying bad faith exception).
213. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (noting compensatory aspect of bad
faith exception).
214. See supra notes 20-84 and accompanying text (describing and criticizing offset cases).
215. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text (recognizing flexibility inherent in
use of bad faith exception).
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